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I. INTRODUCTION
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,1 recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court, has resulted in what one commentator described as "[t]he strongest and
most important sex-discrimination victory in nearly 30 years."2 The issue
before the Court was whether an employer discriminates against unsterile
women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19643 by implementing
policies which prevent them from obtaining jobs that pose a threat of harm to
their potential fetuses.4 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the
Company's sex-based fetal protection policy violated Title VII's prohibition
1111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
2 Marcia Coyle, Fetal Protection Ruling Buoys Rights Groups, THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, April 1, 1991, at 5.
342 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a) (1991).
4111 S. Ct. at 1202. This case was not limited to the issue of balancing the
rights of the woman against the harm facing the unborn child. Included in this
class action was a male employee denied a transfer following concern for the
safety of his reproductive role, a female employee who avoided the loss of her
job by choosing to have herself sterilized, and a 50-year-old divorcee whose
transfer resulted in reduced wages. Id. at 1200.
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against gender discrimination.5 As a result of the decision, employers can no
longer bar women from hazardous jobs through fetal-protection policies,
except under the most extreme and narrow circumstances.6
This legal victory for women in the workplace, however, has seriously
impacted the debate over the protection of fetal health and safety. Ever since
Roe v. Wade7 established the woman's right to privacy regarding her decision
to obtain an abortion8 and the constitutional nonrecognition of the fetus as a
person,9 the fetus has been sacrificed in favor of the mother's rights. In Johnson
Controls, the woman and her unborn child were once again placed as
adversaries in the courtroom. The Supreme Court, in a seemingly encore
presentation of Roe, again overlooked the harm facing the unborn child in
Johnson Controls as it rejected the employer's fetal-protection policy as sex
discrimination within the workplace. In both Johnson Controls and Roe, the
Court provided favorable results for the woman at the expense of the fetus. It
may well be that the Court, in its attempt to protect the woman, is practicing
its own form of discrimination against the fetus.
II. APPLYING THE BFOQ DEFENSE TO FETAL-PROTECTION POLICIES
Johnson Controls is a manufacturer of batteries that utilizes lead as a primary
ingredient. 10 In 1982, Johnson Controls initiated a plan of excluding women
with childbearing capacity from jobs that exposed them to high levels of lead
in the manufacturing process. 11 The company was concerned that this
5Id. at 1204. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Justices Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined. Id. at 1199. Justice
White filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. Id. at 1210. Justice Scalia
authored a separate opinion concurring only in the judgment. Id. at 1216.
6A company must establish that its discriminatory policy falls within the
strict application of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense.
See infra note 14. In analyzing a BFOQ defense, the court should focus on the
person's ability to do the job, not the harm it poses to third persons. See Hannah
Arterian Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The
Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,66 IOWA L. REV. 63,93 (1980). The Supreme Court has allowed exceptions,
however, when the safety of others is threatened due to the environment of
prisons, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), and where potential
emergency situations on airlines threaten the safety of passengers. Western Air
Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
7410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 Id. at 154.
9 Id. at 156-62.
10111 S. Ct. at 1199.
11 1d. at 1199-1200.
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exposure to lead, which has been linked to certain health risks, would pose a
danger to potential fetuses.1 2 In 1984, the plaintiffs commenced legal action
against the company alleging that the fetal-protection policy constituted
sex-discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13
Allegations of employment discrimination required the lower court to apply
a two-step approach in its analysis of Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy.
First, the trial court had to determine the proper standard for evaluating the
company's policy, specifically whether the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense or the more lenient defense of business necessity should be
used. 14 To determine which standard should apply, the court had to focus on
the result the company's policy would have on the female employees.' 5 If the
12I d .
13 Id. at 1200.
1 4 In cases of discrimination, the District Court's first inquiry should be to
focus on classifying the fetal-protection policy as either disparate impact or
disparate treatment in order to determine the appropriate defense to apply.
The narrow BFOQ is an affirmative defense, available under Title VII, that
focuses on the employee's ability to perform the job. In order to establish a
successful BFOQ, the employer must show that the practice is "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e2(e) (1991). Unlike the BFOQ defense, which is found in the language
of the statute, the business necessity defense was established by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The business necessity
defense protects an employer's discriminatory policy upon a finding that the
policy is necessary to the success of the company's performance. Id. at 431.
Courts have subsequently broadened the business necessity defense to include
discriminatory policies that have a legitimate business purpose in facilitating
the safe and efficient operation of the business. See, e.g., Wright v. Olin Corp.,
697 F.2d 1172, 1188-89 (4th Cir. 1982).
15 It is this point of the analysis that has created confusion among the various
courts throughout most discrimination cases. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at
1202 (describing conflicts among the Fourth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals). The discriminatory policy or action must fall within one
of the following three categories: First, disparate impact results when a
protected group is significantly burdened under an employment policy which
appears neutral on its face. An example of disparate impact would be a hiring
policy that sets height or weight requirements which results in the automatic
exclusion of one gender from consideration for the job. Second, facial
discrimination focuses on employer intent and occurs when the policy treats
an individual differently because that individual is a member of a protected
group. Facial discrimination is apparent in Johnson Controls where the
employer expressly prohibited fertile women from obtaining certain jobs. A
third category includes the employer who does not explicitly discriminate but
the results of the employer's hiring methods indicate otherwise. This type of
discrimination exists when the employer has no intention of hiring from a
protected group although the employer continues to accept job applications
1992]
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effect of the policy is judged to result in disparate impact, then the business
necessity defense would apply.16 A finding of disparate treatment, however,
would impose the more difficult task of establishing the narrow BFOQ
standard as prescribed by Congress. 17 Once the court has established the
proper standard, the second step requires the court to determine whether the
employer's policy falls within that framework.
The District Court granted summary judgment to Johnson Controls, stating
that because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the three-part business necessity
inquiry, there was no need to undertake the BFOQ analysis. 18 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, holding that business necessity was the proper standard to
use for evaluating the company's fetal-protection policy.19 The Seventh Circuit
noted, however, that even if the BFOQ defense was applicable, Johnson
Controls would still be entitled to summary judgment. 20 Due to the conflict
among the various appellate courts as to the question of which standard
controls, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the confusion
surrounding the BFOQ defense as it applies to fetal-protection policies. 21
In establishing that Johnson Control's practice was facially discriminatory,
the Supreme Court took the proper course by applying the BFOQ. Johnson
Controls had established a policy that directly targeted a particular group, the
unsterile female.22 Although it has been shown that hazardous lead exposure
may also create risks for the male reproductive system,23 men were not
mentioned in the company's exclusive policy. Since the company's policy was
from that group. See Furnish, supra note 6, at 87-103 (discussing Title VII
defenses). See also Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The
Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title
VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641,678-703 (1981).
16 See supra notes 14-15.
17 See supra notes 14-15.
18111 S. Ct. at 1200. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
19111 S. Ct. at 1200-01.
201d. at 1211.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1203.
23 Exposure to lead from either parent may cause genetic damage prior to
conception. Since there is a greater concern for intrauterine exposure, less
research has been conducted regarding paternal exposure. This lack of research
provides inconclusive results concerning the effects on the fetus resulting from
the male's exposure to lead. See Herbert L. Needleman & David Bellinger,
Commentary: Recent Developments, 46 ENVTL. RES. 190 (1988). But see infra notes
81-89 and accompanying text (indicating the relationship between the
woman's exposure and the harm to the fetus).
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not gender-neutral, the business necessity defense would not be available.24
Support for the company's use of the policy would thus depend upon the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the BFOQ defense as it relates to
fetal-protection policies. The Supreme Court has allowed discriminatory
policies to qualify under the BFOQ defense upon a showing that there is a risk
of harm to third parties.2 5 An employer's fetal-protection policy, therefore,
could qualify as a BFOQ if the Court expanded the defense to include the fetus
as a third party.
Rather than expanding the BFOQ defense to recognize the unborn child,
however, the Court limited the BFOQ defense to the narrow language provided
by Congress under Title VII.26 In the opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the
Court concluded that discrimination based on pregnancy or childbirth within
the meaning of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act(PDA)2 7 is synonymous with
sex discrimination.28 Justice Blackmun relied on the language of the PDA and
reasoned that it was the intention of Congress to limit the BFOQ defense in all
cases of discrimination. 29 Although the opinion focused upon the language of
the statute and the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court expressed its
allowance for exceptions to the statute in previous cases,30 but stated that the
exception is narrowly limited to third-party safety.31 The majority rationalized
their failure to extend the exception to the fetal-protection policy by stating that
the actions of a company can only qualify as a BFOQ if the company's
purported safety requirement related "[tlo the essence or to the central mission
of the employer's business. 32 Thus, the BFOQ's safety exception would only
apply when protecting the safety of third parties is directly associated with the
job performance, and not where its effect on third parties is only ancillary.
III. SUPREME COURT OVERLOOKS OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE
THE FETUS WITHIN THE BFOQ
Three months following the decision in Johnson Controls, Justice Blackmun
recognized the Court's power of judicial review in a concurring opinion by
24111 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
25 See supra note 6.
26 See supra note 14.
27 The PDA amended Title VII in 1978, indicating Congress' intention to
treat women with childbearing capacity no differently for purposes of
sex-discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991).
28111 S. Ct. at 1203.
291d. at 1204.
30 d. at 1205. See also supra note 6 for BFOQ exceptions under the PDA.
31111 S. Ct. at 1205.
32 id.
19921
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stating that "[t]his Court has the power to say what the law is, when the court
changes its mind the law changes with it.' 33 This power was neglected in
Johnson Controls when Justice Blackmun's majority opinion failed to expand the
BFOQ defense. The Court's strict adherence to the language of the PDA
overlooked two alternatives that would have permitted fetal harm to qualify
as a BFOQ.
First, Johnson Controls could have been distinguished from other
discrimination cases arising under the PDA, thereby allowing the Court to
provide another exception to the BFOQ. The Supreme Court's conclusion that
the PDA was enacted to prevent discrimination based on childbirth or
pregnancy is not without fault. It has been suggested that the PDA was a
response by Congress to prevent future acts of discrimination that may affect
a woman's interest regarding abortion.34 The language of the PDA explicitly
refers to abortions but is silent regarding the relationship between a woman's
choice to maintain her pregnancy and the protection of the fetus. 35 Johnson
Controls did not present the questions which revolve around abortion but did
encompass the social concern for protecting the fetus and future generations.
Congress' failure to address this issue thrust upon the judiciary the necessary
task of striking a balance between fetal protection and sex discrimination. A
proper balance could have been negotiated between the two interests by
reevaluating the BFOQ defense and permitting the inclusion of the fetus within
the BFOQ framework. 3 6
Johnson Controls provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to draw
a distinction between the facts of this case and other forms of discrimination.
This case dealt with an employer whose concern for the health of the fetus, as
well as the business risks associated with it, precluded unsterile women from
jobs which exposed them to hazardous conditions. It may be argued that the
result in Roe v. Wade37 afforded the female the freedom of choice regarding the
future of her unborn child. The precise issue and holding in Roe, however,
focused only on the woman's right to privacy regarding her decision to have
an abortion.38 Though the Supreme Court held that a woman has a funda-
33 james B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439,2451 (1991).
34 Fumish, supra note 6, at 82.
3542 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991).
3 6Thus, where there is a risk of harm to the fetus, a company's
discriminatory policy could still qualify under the BFOQ on the theory that a
fetus is a third party whose safety is a legitimate concern to the company.
Unfortunately, the Court focused only on the discriminatory impact on the
woman, ignoring its responsibility to protect the fetus from risk of harm. See
infra pp 6-8.
37410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38 Id. at 154.
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mental right to abort the fetus,3 9 their decision in Roe no longer applies when
the woman's decision is not to end, but to maintain the pregnancy. There can
be no legal analogy between abortion and childbirth. The two situations
necessitate segregated treatment by the courts because the argument
supporting the right to obtain an abortion cannot be applicable in the context
of fetal protection. Where an abortion discards any future for the fetus, a
continued pregnancy may result in human life. Therefore, consideration
should be given to any harm that may have a detrimental effect on that
potential life.
The second alternative that would have permitted fetal-protection policies
to fall within the BFOQ would have been the inclusion of the unborn child as
a third party for purposes of the safety exception. Justice Blackmun's opinion
clearly stated that the predominating factor to consider in determining the
BFOQ is the woman's ability to safely and efficiently perform her job. 40 Yet, as
Justice White pointed out in his concurring opinion, the Supreme Court has
previously stated that its first inquiry under the BFOQ analysis must "[aldjust
to the safety factor."4 1 The Court, however, indicated its unwillingness to
extend the BFOQ defense by the deceptive use of the safety exception set out
in Dothard v. Rawlinson.42 In Dothard, the Court was faced with a woman's
attempt to secure a job as a prison guard, a job which would pose a danger to
her safety as well as the safety of the convicts. The majority in Dothard stated
that Title VII permits the woman to decide whether to assume the risks
associated with a dangerous job.43 The Court, however, applied the safety
factor in establishing a BFOQ defense that supported the employer's
discriminatory policy 44 Dothard could have been used as the authority to
3 9 Id. at 153.
40111 S. Ct. at 1207.
4 11d. at 1212. In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), the
Court, in its analysis of the relationship between safety and age discrimination,
stated that the "inquiry adjusts to the safety factor by ensuring that the
employer's restrictive job qualifications are reasonably necessary." Id. at 413.
42433 U.S. 321 (1977).
43 Id. at 335. The Dothard Court addressed the issue of whethera state policy,
which set height and weight requirements and thereby limited women from
obtaining positions as prison guards, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.
44It would appear that the Dothard Court applied a double standard in its
recognition of the BFOQ defense. justice Marshall in his Dothard dissent infers
the double standard when he points out that, although the Court finds it
unacceptable to disqualify a woman because of the potential danger posed by
the job, the majority justifies the BFOQ defense by speculating on her sexuality
as a female guard. Id. at 342.
1992]
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expand the BFOQ safety exception, but the Johnson Controls Court left it
undisturbed, recognizing it as a narrow exception.45
Nevertheless, Dothard illustrates that the Supreme Court has not always
maintained strict adherence to the language of Title VII when evaluating which
exceptions qualify as a BFOQ. Congress could not possibly foresee all situations
and the various circumstances under which the BFOQ defense may arise. It is
these unanticipated circumstances which merit reconsideration by the courts
in expanding the analysis. Safety was not a factor explicitly presented within
the PDA,46 but was judicially created to provide the courts with a certain
amount of flexibility for calculating the BFOQ in cases of discrimination. When
faced with the choice of obtaining a job which may present health risks or
reproductive dangers, the Johnson Controls' majority, like the Dothard Court, left
the decision to the woman.47 But the Court in Johnson Controls distinguished
Dothard, failing to include prenatal health concerns under Dothard's third-party
safety factor for the purpose of establishing a BFOQ.
Accepting the Supreme Court's position in Johnson Controls would be to
assume that the unborn child or fetus cannot be considered a third party in
analyzing the BFOQ. By establishing the right of the woman to make the
unfettered decision regarding the risks she takes in her job, the Court has failed
to recognize the harm facing the unborn. It is a mistake to overlook the fetus
as a third party for purposes of the BFOQ analysis, especially when the unborn
child has historically been recognized throughout the civil and criminal
courts.48
IV. LIABILITY RESULTING FROM SUPREME COURT'S RULING
A. Harmful Exposure and the Fetus: Criminal Neglect and Abuse?
Women who take drugs and alcohol during pregnancy increasingly find
themselves facing criminal prosecution.49 In most of these cases the
45il S. Ct.at 1207.
4 6The language of the statute that describes the BFOQ defense reads
"[r]easonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business."
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1991).
47111 S. Ct. at 1210.
4 8 Criminal action is being taken against women who have used drugs or
alcohol during pregnancy. The courts consider the fetus as a child for purposes
of the substance abuse cases. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. Tort
liability is being recognized for injuries to the child resulting from harm to the
fetus prior to birth. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
49 At least 50 women have found themselves faced with criminal action
following the use of drugs and alcohol while pregnant. Janet L. Dolgin, The
Law's Response to Parental Alcohol and "Crack Abuse," BROOK. L. REv. 1213,1245
(1991).
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prosecution challenges the woman's fitness as a mother in order to prove a
finding of criminal neglectS0 To establish the neglect of the mother, prosecutors
introduce into evidence drug and alcohol abuse during pregnancy.5 1 The
assumption being made by both the prosecutors and the courts in these
substance abuse cases is that the fetus should be treated like a neglected or
abused child.52 Support for these decisions is based on the theory that the child
has been placed in danger as a result of the mother's prenatal conduct.53
A woman's decision to take a job which poses a hazard to the fetus is not
unlike the woman's decision to take drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. Both
involve choices made by the woman that may present risks to the health of the
unborn child. If criminal charges and convictions can be brought against the
mother for substance abuse,54 it follows that action should be taken against the
woman who chooses to work in an occupation that presents these same risks
to the fetus.55
Although a mother faces criminal charges for fetal abuse in other regards,
the Johnson Controls Court stated that "decisions about the welfare of future
children must be left to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them
rather than to the employers who hire those parents."56 Perhaps the Court is
suggesting that the only time a mother should be absolved from responsibility
regarding the well-being of the fetus is when her decision relates to
employment. But the majority further implies that economic considerations
should not be used for the purpose of evaluating discriminatory policies. 57 It
follows that there should exist no meaningful distinction between a woman's
50 d. at 1246-49.
51 Id. at 1247-50.
52 Id. at 1247-51.
53See In re Valerie D., 595 A.2d 922 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991); In re Stefanel
Tyesha C., 556 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1990).
54 The discovery of cocaine in the unsevered umbilical cords of two babies
resulted in a woman's conviction for delivering a controlled substance to the
fetuses. Johnson v. State, 578 So.2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
55 This is not to dispute the fact that drug use is illegal and might be an
improper comparison to toxic exposure on the job. Alcohol, however, is not
illegal and despite warnings women may continue to consume alcohol
throughout pregnancy. Although alcohol may present some risk to the fetus,
it remains the woman's choice to drink alcohol. The pregnant woman who
drinks may nevertheless find herself facing charges for criminal neglect. A
related argument can be advanced against the woman who takes a job under
conditions which may pose the same threat of harm to her fetus.
56 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207 (1991).
57 The Court stated that additional costs associated with hiring one gender
cannot justify an employer's discriminatory policy. Id. at 1209.
19921
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economic and social choices. According to their logic, a woman should have
the same right to determine the well-being of the unborn child regardless of
whether or not she is within the work place. This would mean that a woman's
decision to use drugs or alcohol while pregnant would be supported under the
reasoning used in Johnson Controls. The results in the cases dealing with
substance abuse indicate that the woman does not have this choice, thus
contradicting the Johnson Controls rationale.
Although various existing studies indicate that exposure to lead will harm
the fetus,5 8 what distinguishes that harm from the dangers resulting from the
woman's use of alcohol or drugs? The Court's precedents stand at odds when
it rules that it is a crime for a female to use her social time in a way which poses
a danger to her pregnancy, but that it is that same woman's right to obtain a
job which presents these same risks to her unborn.
B. Suing the Employer and Mom for Damages
Another issue raised in Johnson Controls concerned the potential tort liability
that employers may bear resulting from harm to the fetus. Prenatal torts were
first recognized in 1946 when a federal district court in Bonbrest v. Kotz59 held
that a child born alive was entitled to damages if the injury occurred while the
fetus was viable.6° Currently, every jurisdiction allows an action for damages
due to prenatal injuries provided the child is born alive,61 and in many
jurisdictions, courts have even abandoned the viability requirement. 62 In a few
cases, the courts have extended recognition to injuries resulting from
negligence occurring prior to conception. 63
In Johnson Controls, the Court dismissed the issue of tort liability by stating
that the BFOQ analysis does not consider the potential costs incurred by future
lawsuits.64 The majority claims that a business will not be liable for injuries to
the fetus as long as the employer acts without negligence and the employee is
58 See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
59 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
60 Id. at 142.
61 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 55, at 368-69 (5th ed. 1984).
6 2 Id.
63 See Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th. Cir. 1978) (permitting infant
to maintain suit for injuries resulting from caesarean section negligently
performed on mother 32 months prior to birth); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson
Laboratories, Inc. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (allowing twins to maintain
cause of action for defendant's defective birth control pills ingested by their
mother prior to conception resulting in their birth as mongoloids). Seegenerally
KEETON, et aL., supra note 61 § 55 at 369.
64111 S. Ct. at 1208-09.
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warned about the risks associated with the job.65 This is a baseless assertion for
the following two reasons. First, although a person has been warned and will
later be barred from recovery, a child's cause of action for negligence cannot be
waived by the parent. 66 Second, the majority failed to consider the possibility
that strict liability can be imposed on the employer upon a determination that
the manufacturing process is abnormally dangerous.67 Although a business
complies with appropriate regulations by incorporating safeguards, the
question remains whether the precautions taken will be adequate enough to
absolve the employer from liability due to the shifting levels of safe exposure. 68
A 1988 study indicated that the standard of lead exposure determined safe by
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in 1978 should
now be considered hazardous to the employee.69 It cannot be discounted that
an employer will beheld strictly liable due to abnormally dangerous conditions
resulting from the diminished safe levels of exposure.
It is unreasonable to overlook the employer's impossible task of avoiding
negligence. Recent studies reveal that lead levels considered safe for the
woman or child may nonetheless be dangerous to the fetus. 70 Although OSHA
65 Id. at 1208.
6 6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 488(1) (1965).
671d. at § 869 comment b (1979).
68 The problem facing the employer regarding strict liability and negligence
is two-fold. First, satisfying the revised safe standards will force the employer
to implement more stringent safeguards. As a result, a business will be required
to expend more time and money to cover the additional costs. Second,
establishing proper safeguards may take time before a business is able to
conform to the safe exposure level. In order to avoid liability, an employer may
be forced to reassign or possibly terminate the affected employees. An
employer will not be permitted to choose the latter alternative under the
holding in Johnson Controls. Thus, an employer is confronted with additional
expenditures protecting against liability that may be unavoidable.
69 David Rempel, The Lead-Exposed Worker, 262 JAMA 532 (1989).
70In Johnson Controls, the Court noted that the critical level of lead exposure
for employees planning a family was set at 30 micrograms per deciliter by
OSHA. 111 S. Ct. at 1200. Current research indicates that concern for the child's
health should occur when the blood lead level exceeds 10 micrograms per
deciliter. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS 43 (July 1988) [hereinafter A REPORT TO CONGRESS]; See also U.S.
Centerfor Disease Control, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Press Release:
Preventing Lead Poisoning in Young Children 1 (Oct. 7, 1991) [hereinafter CDC
Press Release]. This means that the safe level for employees is three times greater
than the level of exposure considered safe for their children. The fetus may be
even more susceptible to lead exposure than the child and, thus, would require
the use of a lower safe level. See Kim N. Dietrich et al., Low-Level Fetal Lead
Exposure Effect on Neurobehavioral Development in Early Infancy, 80 PEDIATRICS
19921
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sets a standard considered safe for employees who are planning families, 71 a
company may be forced to set a more stringent standard to safeguard the fetus
in order to avoid liability for negligence. This may be a difficult standard to
establish since the full impact of in utero exposure to lead is dependent upon
ongoing long-term studies that have not yet provided tangible results. 72 An
employer who is unable to bear the burden of establishing a fetal-protection
policy will be forced to hire unsterile women even though risks to the health
of the fetus may be present.73
Similarly, the mother may also find herself confronted with liability for the
harm resulting from her negligence in accepting a job that presents risks to the
health of her child. Immunity from tort liability which was once accepted due
to the parent-child relationship has been losing recognition and may no longer
shield the parent from liability.74 It is believed that compensating the injured
child outweighs the arguments that were advanced to support the immunity.75
V. STATE INTERVENTION AND FETAL-PROTECTION POLICIES
One question left unanswered by Johnson Controls is whether the states, as
opposed to private employers, may initiate policies that prevent women from
working at jobs that pose a threat of dangerous lead exposure to the fetus. State
intervention will not be successful unless the state can show that its compelling
interest in protecting the life of the fetus is sufficient enough to exceed the
woman's fundamental rights.76 In Roe v. Wade, the Court established a balance
721, 729 (1987). It therefore follows that the employee's safe level should be at
least three times greater than what would be considered safe for the fetus.
71 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
72 See, e.g., Dietrich et al., supra note 70, at 728-29. The authors indicate that
future studies will be needed to determine the effects of fetal lead exposure on
children throughout their development into later childhood. Id. at 729.
73Johnson Controls was unable to establish a BFOQ defense based on the
standard established by OSHA. Studies show that a lower standard should be
established in order to protect the fetus from lead exposure. See supra note 70.
OSHA's safe level of exposure for women is three times greater than the
recommended level of fetal exposure presented by the congressionally-
mandated report. These results indicate that the employer is faced with a
significant burden in establishing a BFOQ defense. The company, unable to
qualify for the BFOQ, will be forced to employ women in high exposure
positions and subsequent harm to their fetuses may result in damages against
the employer for negligence.
74 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895G(1) and comment a (1979).
75 Id. at comment c.
76 Roe's compelling interest test was controlling at the time Johnson Controls
was decided. Recently, some of the principles established under Roe were
weakened in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). Casey has
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between the woman's fundamental right to privacy and the state's compelling
interest in protecting potential human life.77 Roe determined that a state's
interest in protecting the fetus cannot prevail over the mother's rights until the
fetus is viable.78 It was determined by the Court that the point of viability was
at the conclusion of the second trimester.79 The Court noted, however, that the
state has an "[i]mportant and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality
of human life."80
The detrimental effect on potential life caused from lead exposure to the
nonviable fetus supports state intervention. The health risks to the unborn child
cannot be overlooked by the states. In a recent congressionally-mandated study
of childhood exposure to lead, strong evidence was presented which suggests
that the human fetus is at high risk to hazardous lead exposure.81 Results
indicate that the impact on in utero exposure may be irreversible and that fetal
exposure will continue to increase until the hazard is removed from the
woman's environment.82 The study concluded that fetal lead exposure is an
replaced the compelling interest test with the more lenient standard of undue
burden. Id. at 2821. Undue burden allows the state to regulate abortions prior
to viability, if the purpose or effect does not substantially interfere with the
woman's choice. Id. The result in Casey recognizes the state's greater interest in
protecting potential life. Casey may be the authority needed to support state
action regarding fetal protection policies.
77410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
78 Id. at 163.
79 Although the Court held that a woman had a fundamental right to obtain
an abortion, this right was not absolute. 410 U.S. at 154. In Roe, the woman's
pregnancy was apportioned into three segments referred to as trimesters. Id.
at 162. The trimester framework provided a guideline for balancing the state's
interest in protecting the fetus and the woman's fundamental right to privacy
regarding her decision to obtain an abortion. Under the trimester framework,
a state does not have a compelling interest until the end of the first trimester.
Id. at 163. The state may regulate the abortion following the first trimester if its
interest reasonably relates to protecting the mother's health. Id. State regulation
of the abortion may occur following the second trimester if the state's
compelling interest is the protection of potential life and there exists no risk to
the health or life of the woman. Id. The Roe trimester framework was still intact
at the time Johnson Controls was decided. Casey has rejected the principle of
trimesters in favor of the undue burden standard. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
80410 U.S. at 158.
8 1 See A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70.
82 Unless there is a reduction of lead exposure within the population of
pregnant women, the number of fetuses exposed to lead will increase 100%
annually. For example, over a ten-year period beginning in 1984, the number
of effected fetuses will increase from 400,000 to 4,000,000. See A REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 70, at I 48-49. The congressional report indicates that
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increasingly important public health issue and that one of the main concerns
should be providing an effective system to control the unacceptable quantities
of lead to the fetus.83
Lead poisoning in the United States is currently the most common pediatric
health problem.84 Recently, the United States Center for Disease Control (CDC)
stated that greater emphasis should be placed on preventing children from
contracting the disease.85 More significantly, the CDC has reevaluated the safe
exposure level for children and reduced itby 60% from the standard established
in 1985.86 The findings of the CDC are complemented by a 1989 report which
indicates that high postnatal exposure to lead following high prenatal exposure
will have an adverse effect on the growth of the child.87 This means that a child
who is exposed to lead as a fetus, unless subsequently placed in a lead-free
environment, will be at a greater disadvantage during his or her development.
Additional studies suggest that prenatal exposure will increase the risk for
repeated toxicity 88 as well as cause an inverse effect on the child's mental
development.89
These studies demand that the health risks facing the unborn child from lead
exposure cannot be overlooked. Since abortion is not the issue, and since Roe
no longer applies when the woman's choice is to maintain the pregnancy, the
rationale behind Roe cannot be used to defeat the state's compelling interest in
protecting potential life. First, viability cannot be the determining factor in
balancing the interests of the state against the mother's interest. Although Roe
concerns about the health of the fetus should exist when lead exposure exceeds
10 micrograms per deciliter. Id. at I 43. Johnson Controls initiated its
fetal-protection policy following the discovery that the blood level of pregnant
women exceeded 30 micrograms per deciliter. 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
83A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70, at 1 49-50.
84 CDC Press Release, supra note 70, at 4.
85 Id. at 3.
861d. at 1.
87 Rakesh Shukla et al., Fetal and Infant Lead Exposure: Effects on Growth in
Stature, 84 PEDIATRICS 604, 611 (1989).
88 Morri E. Narkowitz& Howard L. Weinberger, Immobilization Related Lead
Toxicity in Previously LeadPoisoned Children, 86 PEDIATRICS 455, 457 (1990).
Although lead stored in the bones may be metabolically inert, results indicate
that an exception may exist for the fetus; maternal bone lead may be released
during the pregnancy which poses risks to the sensitive fetus. Id. at 455.
89 David Bellinger et al., Longitudinal Analyses of Prenatal and Postnatal Lead
Exposure and Early Cognitive Development, 316 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1037, 1039-40
(1987). An inverse relationship existed between the infant's Mental
Development Index score and the umbilicalcord blood lead level. See also
Dietrich et al., supra note 70 at, 728-29.
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determined that the state's interest in the fetus cannot prevail over the mother's
interest prior to viability, a lead-exposed fetus faces dangerous health risks even
during the early weeks of gestation. Thus, the state's interest in protecting
potential life comes into existence prior to viability.90 Second, a woman's choice
to maintain her pregnancy must be distinguished from her decision to obtain
an abortion. When a woman obtains an abortion, the termination of the fetus
destroys the state interest. A woman's choice to maintain her pregnancy does
not destroy potential life, and consequently, the state's concern for subsequent
harm to the fetus should persist throughout the pregnancy 9l
VI. CONCLUSION
Ten years following the enactment of the PDA, a report studying lead
exposure among children was presented to Congress indicating the increasing
health concern for in utero exposure. 92 Additional research shows that exposure
to lead can have a detrimental effect on the fetus. 93 Johnson Controls presented
an opportunity for the Supreme Court to preserve employment policies
protecting the developing fetus from dangerous exposure in the workplace.
The Court's failure to recognize the fetus as a third party under the BFOQ
defense will place an impossible burden upon employers to establish a
fetal-protection policy. It defies logic that the Court recognizes the safety of
prison inmates94 under the BFOQ defense but ignores the safety and health of
the unborn child. Such contradictory rulings create an injustice.
The fetus again stands as the loser in the struggle between the rights of the
woman and the protection of potential life. Originally confronted with the issue
of sex discrimination in the workplace, the Supreme Court in Johnson Controls
has replaced fetal protection policies with its own form of a discriminatory
policy against the unborn child. Although a woman can be charged for the
criminal neglect and abuse of the fetus, 95 a child can maintain an action for
90 It was determined in Roe that the fetus is considered viable following the
conclusion of the second trimester. Lead is absorbed in fetal tissues throughout
the pregnancy. See Dietrich et al., supra note 70, at 721. When a woman decides
to maintain her pregnancy, the state's compelling interest in the potential life
of the fetus occurs earlier because the accumulation of lead may pose health
risks before the fetus becomes viable.
91 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the Court
recognized the state's interest in protecting human life throughout the
pregnancy: 'We do not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability." Id. at 519.
92 A REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 70.
93 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
94 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,336 (1977).
95 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
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prenatal injuries96 and property can be devised to an unborn child,97 the
Supreme Court still refuses to recognize the fetus when the issue concerns fetal
health.
One court has stated that "[a] child has a legal right to begin life with a sound
mind and body."98 The danger associated with fetal lead exposure hinders that
right and demands state intervention. The question remaining is whether state
regulation relating to fetal protection will prevail over the rights of the woman.
The substantial harm facing the unborn child should support state protection
throughout fetal development. Otherwise, the dangers facing the lead-exposed
fetus will remain minimal when compared to the harm resulting from a legal
system that continues to reject any attempts to protect the unborn child.
JOHN M. TKACIK, JR.
96 See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
97 Most states under "pretermitted heir" statutes, as well as the Uniform
Probate Code, allow children born sub sequent to the execution of a will to share
in the estate. Seegenerally WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN. JR. ETAL., WILLS, TRUSTSAND
ESTATES INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 3.6, at 106-07 (1988).
State statutes also provide the unborn child with a share of the estate in the
situation when a will is lacking. For example, Ohio provides that
"[d]escendants of an intestate begotten before his death, but born thereafter, in
all cases will inherit as if born during the lifetime of the intestate and surviving
him." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (Anderson 1990).
9 8Matter of Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. App. 1980).
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